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STATE OF UTAH 
~TATJ<j OF UTAH, 
Plainti;f f-R espondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
CARLY LE A. SMITH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
10294 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Carlyle A. Smith, appeals from a con-
\ 1clinn of the crime of assault upon a child under the age 
11 f 11 years, in violation of 76-7-9, Utah Code Annotated, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried by jury trial in the District 
\'ourt of San Juan County, State of Utah, for the crime 
r-l1arged in the information. The jury returned a verdict 
11f guilty, and appellant was sentenced to be imprisoned in 
the State Prison for a period not to exceed five years. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the conviction should be aff'. , 
llllltr:. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 10th day of June, 1964, Lynette May, a six year 
old child (T. 18), saw the appellant at Smith's Drug Store 
in Moab, Utah (T. 6, 41). Ac-cording to the child, the ap-
pellant offered to give her some candy if she would come 
down to his house (T. 10, 41). The appellant corroborate~ 
this in part (T. 41). The child testified as to the rout~ 
taken in going to the appellant's home. She rode ana 
walked her bike with the appellant to his house (T. 7, 8). 
After arriving at the appellant's home, the child stated 
that the appellant told her to take off her pants, which 
she did, and got on the bed. That, thereafter, the appellant 
played with her private parts (T. 8). The appellant un· 
zipped his pants and had the child rub his penis, and 
asked the child to commit an act fellatio (T. 89). The chil11 
then testified that she heard her mother honking and the 
appellant instructed her to put on her pants. She went tu 
the door which was locked, and her sister was knocking 
at the door (T. 9). 
The child's mother testified that she had authorized 
her child to go for a few minutes to the appellant's house; 
that after the child had been gone about fifteen minutes, 
she went to the home, whi{;h was approximately two and 
one-half blocks away from where the child and her mother 
resided (T. 19). She knocked at the door of the appellant's 
-
3 
)1,, 11 .,,. :ind tried to open the door, but it was locked. She 
!!wn wm1t around to a window and looked in where she 
s~i\\ Lynette and the appellant on the bed. The child had 
r,c'l' pants down and the appellant had his hand on the 
child's private parts, and the child had her hand on the ap-
pellant's sex organ (T. 20-21). She went out to the car 
and wntinued to honk the horn while her other daughter 
knotked on the door in an attempt to gain admittance (T. 
21), 
Subsequent to the event, that same day, Mrs. May con-
fronted the appellant and the appellant admitted "petting 
tile child a little" (T. 22). The appellant said at the time 
uf trial that he meant a petting on the head or back (T. 
46). The event occurred between 3 :00-4 :00 p.m. and Mrs. 
!\fay called the police, after discussing the matter with her 
husband, at approximately 7 :30 p.m. (T. 33). A deputy 
sheriff testified that he could look from an outside window 
nf the appellant's house into the bedroom and see the bed 
Cl'. 38). The appellant admitted the presence of the child 
in his home but denied taking indecent liberties (T. 41-48). 
Subsequently, the trial court instructed the jury. No 
exceptions to the instructions were taken by the appellant 
IT. 52). After the jury had retired, they returned for 
clarification of the court's instructions. Subsequently, the 
iury returned again and the court again gave clarifying 
instructions ( T. 53-55) . No exceptions were taken to any 
of the instructions given by the court. Upon the above evi-
dence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Further .facts 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED 
ITS DISCRETION IN LETTING LYNETTE 
MAY TESTIFY. 
The appellant contends that the trial court admitted 
error in allowing Lynette May to testify. At the time shr 
testified, she was seven years old (T. 16). Prior to her 
testimony, the District Attorney interrogated Lynette in 
the presence of the court, the appellant, and the appellant'i 
counsel. She indicated where she lived, acknowledged that 
she was in school in the second grade, who her teacher 
was, and the names of her brothers and sisters (T. 3, 4). 
Further, she indicated that she knew what it was to tell 
the truth and knew what happened if she told a lie. She 
acknowledged that she knew it was bad not to tell the truth, 
that she attended Sunday School, acknowledged a belief in 
God and that she intended to tell the truth. She understood 
that if she testified falsely, she would be punished (T. 3-5). 
Based upon the acknowledgments to the interrogation, the 
trial court administered the oath. No objection was made 
at any time to the testimony of Lynette May or to the ad· 
ministration of the oath. During the course of her testl· 
mony, she was responsive and graphic in her explanation 
of what had occurred. Her testimony was greatly corrob· 
orated by her mother's eyewitness account of the transac· 
ti on. 
The appellant's position is that the court did not ex: 
amine the child to ascertain whether she was capable ot 
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ren:iving correct impressions and able to relay facts ac-
' urately. It is submitted that the appellant's position is 
irithout merit. 
At the outset, it is submitted that the appellant is in 
no position to challenge the trial court's action since no 
objection was raised at the time of trial. It is the general 
rule that a person challenging the competency of a wit-
ness must object prior to the time the witness is sworn or 
at least as soon as the incompetency of the witness is dis-
covered. Abbott Criminal Triul Practice, 4th Ed. § 268. 
If the appellant had felt that the trial court had acted im-
properly in allowing Lynette May to testify, it was incum-
lJent to raise the objection at the time of trial. The fail-
nre to interpose any objection, indicates a waiver on the 
pnrt of the appellant and further tends to support the con-
ciusion that those who saw the witness and heard the re-
.;;ponse to her questions felt that there was no question as 
Lo the child's competency. 
It is well settled in Utah law that the question of the 
cnmpetency of an infant witness is one within the sound 
ciisvrrtion of the trial court and this court will not over-
1 u!e the trial court's decision in an absence of a clear show-
ing that the trial court abused its discretion. State v. 
Blythe, 20 U. 379, 58 Pac. 1108 (1899); State v. Morasco, 
42 U. 5, 128 Pac. 571 (1912); State v. McMillan, 46 U. 19, 
140 Pac. 833 (1915); State v. Zeezich, 61 U. 61, 210 Pac. 
927 (1922); State v. Williams, 111 U. 379, 180 P. 2d 551 
\1947). 
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Contrary to the assertions in the appellant's brief, the 
examination of the witness was not limited to her a~know]. 
edgments of a need to tell the truth. She was also examined 
prior to being administered the oath on the question of her 
relationship to her family, where she resided, and the grade 
she was in in school - all of which tended to prove the 
witness's ability to correctly relate facts. 
In State v. Blythe, supra, the court indicated that i\ 
was proper in weighing whether or not the trial court had 
abused its discretion in allowing a witness to testify, to 
consider the testimony given during trial. In that case, the 
court found that a six year old girl who was the victim of an 
assault with intent to commit rape was a competent wit-
ness. The court stated: 
"* * * The little girl testified distinctly to 
acts, on the part of the defendant, tending to show 
the commission of the offense eharged, and her evi-
dence on material points, as appears from the tran· 
script was corroborated by the testimony of other 
witnesses. Under such circumstances the court was 
warranted in submitting the case to the jury." 
In State v. Morasco, supra, the questions asked and 
approved by this court on appeal were very similar to those 
asked in the instant case. The court ruled that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the witness 
was competent to testify. In State v. McMillan, supra, this 
court indieated that a child between age seven and eight 
as was the witness in the instant case at the time of trial, 
was competent to testify. In State v. Zeez~ch, supra, the 












The appellant had been convicted of the same crime as the 
instant appellant. The witness, an eight year old child, re-
sponded to questions in a manner similar to those posed in 
the case now before the court. This court ruled that the 
competency of the witness under such circumstances was 
established and could not be set aside on appeal. 
In State v. Williams, supra, this court found that the 
competency of the witness was open to question, but indi-
cated that the trial judge had the opportunity to see the 
witness and to consider .factors which were obscure on ap-
peal. The court ruled that under such circumstances it 
could not say that the trial court had abused its discretion. 
It is apparent, therefore, that under the circumstances pro-
vided in this case, the trial court properly allowed Lynette 
May to testify. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY, UPON 
THE JURY'S REQUEST, AFTER COMMENC-
ING THEIR DELIBERATIONS. 
The appellant contends that the trial court committed 
error when, subsequent to the jury's commencing their 
deliberations and after their having been originally in-
structed by the court, the jury returned requesting clarifi-
cation. Contrary to the appellant's assertion on page 15 
of his brief, there is nothing in the record which would 
support a conclusion that when the jury requested addi-
tional instructions, that they had reached a verdict that 
8 
the appellant was guilty of simple assault (T. 53) R th 
· a e1 
when the jury first requested the assistance of the ' court 
the question that appeared to be in the jury's mind wa; 
whether or not if they found the appellant guilty of in. 
decent assault, they would have to also find the appellant 
guilty of simple assault. The court indicated that the one 
offense was included within the other and defined the 'w '"~ 
offenses in accordance with its previous instructions. SuiJ-
sequently, the jury returned again asking for clarificatiun 
of the court's instruction that if the jury found or entei-
tained a reasonable doubt as to the degree of crime the 
defendant had committed, that they should resolve the 
doubt and find the defendant guilty of the lesser crime. At 
no time did the court emphasize that the jury should reach 
any particular finding. Indeed, the appellant's brief does 
not pinpoint any particular error in the instructions. Fur-
ther, no exception to the instructions was taken. It is well 
established that before an appellant may claim error in the 
instructions given by the trial court, exceptions must be 
taken, 77-37-1, U. C. A., 1953. 
In State v. Cooper, 114 U. 517, 207 P. 2d 764 (1949), 
the defendant was convicted of the crime of indecent as-
sault. The court concluded that in the absence of an ex-
ception having been taken to the court's instructions, the 
appellant could not claim error on appeal. See also Sta/, 
v. Anderson, 75 U. 496, 286 Pac. 645. In State v. Cobo. au 
U. 89, 60 P. 2d 952, this court observed that it was a well 
settled rule that in the absence of exceptions to instructioni, 
. d 1 H er the court error may not be cla1me on appea. owev , · 
9 
ncitcd an exception where the instructions were palpably 
erroneous, constituting manifest prejudice to the party 
~g:grieved. In the instant case, the instructions demonstrate 
no prror, let alone manifest error or palpable disregard for 
the rights of the accused. As a consequence, the failure of 
the ,1ppelbnt to take an exception to the instructions given 
11•1 the court, precludes his claim of error on appeal. 
In spite of the failu11e of appellant to take an excep-
tion, it is submitted that the instructions given were proper. 
The court's expression of the definition of assault as lesser 
included within the crime of indecent assault is a restate-
ment of the statutory definition set forth in 76-7-1, U. C. 
A, 1%3. In State v. Waid, 92 U. 297, 67 P. 2d 647, the 
rr1urt determined that simple assault could be lesser in-
cluded in the crime of indecent assault. Consequently, the 
court was proper in ref erring to the definition of simple 
a~sault so that the jury could understand the legal require-
ments the prosecution had to meet to convict of the lesser 
offense. Further, since the manner and circumstances of 
indecent assault need merely show an unlawful touching in 
an indecent manner, State v. McMillan, supra, (see also 
State v. Saunders, 82 U. 170, 22 P. 2d 1043; Russell Crime, 
12th ed., vol. 1, p. 723), the court was correct in instructing 
the jury that the nature of the assault required to convict 
f0r inderent assault and that involved in simple assault 
niav be different. See concurring opinion Wolfe, Justice, 
State V. Waid, supra. 
Finally, it should be noted that the questions which 
thP iury asked were in no way inconsistent with their ulti-
10 
mate result. They were concerned first as to whether or 
not there was a necessity to convict on both simple assault 
and indecent assault and secondly, how they should a<:t if 
there was any doubt in their minds concerning the offense 
committed. The instructions of the court obviously cleared 
the confusion that existed in the jury's mind enabling thetn 
to bring in a verdict swiftly. It is apparent, therefore, that 
the trial court's oral instructions in no way coerced the 
jury into rendering a particular verdict, but merely prop. 
erly apprised them of the law in such a manner that they 
were able to apply the facts and reach a verdict. There is 
no error on this point. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
The evidence in the instant case is more than ample 
to sustain the jury's verdict. It is comparable to the evi· 
dence found sufficient in other cases by this court, State 
v. Saunders, supra; State v. Cooper, supra. The facts, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
disclose that the appellant lured a small child to his home 
with the promise of candy. That, thereafter, he caused 
the child to disrobe and fondled her private parts and in· 
duced the child to reciprocate. The child's mother viewed 
the appellant while performing the indecent act. The ap· 
pellant made admissions that he petted the child. The po· 
lice were called after the child's mother had consulted her 
husband. The testimony of the child as to the door being 
locked was corroborated by the mother's testimony. A 
11 
deputy sheriff indicated that it was possible to see through 
a window from the side of the house into the bedroom, thus 
supporting Mrs. May's testimony. The jury had full oppor-
tunity to view the evidence, including the appellant's pro-
testations of innocence. They resolved the issue in favor 
of the appellant's guilt. There is sufficient evidence to 
prove the elements of the crime and to sustain the jury's 
verdict. The decision should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in the instant case amply demonstrate that 
the jury acted properly in finding the appellant guilty of 
the crime charged. The legal claims of error upon which 
the appellant relies for reversal are wholly without merit. 
The court's oral instructions were in no way offensive. 
When it is considered that no exception was taken and that 
the jury had the otherwise unassailed written instructions 
of the court also to guide them, it is obvious there is no 
merit to the claim of instructional error. Further, a sim-
ple perusal of the record makes it manifest that the court 
did not abuse its discretion in allowing a child, who is a 
victim of the offense, to testify. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 




Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
